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Abstract
Scrub jays are thought to use many tactics to protect their caches. For instance, they predominantly bury food far away
from conspecifics, and if they must cache while being watched, they often re-cache their worms later, once they are in
private. Two explanations have been offered for such observations, and they are intensely debated. First, the birds may
reason about their competitors’ mental states, with a ‘theory of mind’; alternatively, they may apply behavioral rules learned
in daily life. Although this second hypothesis is cognitively simpler, it does seem to require a different, ad-hoc behavioral
rule for every caching and re-caching pattern exhibited by the birds. Our new theory avoids this drawback by explaining a
large variety of patterns as side-effects of stress and the resulting memory errors. Inspired by experimental data, we assume
that re-caching is not motivated by a deliberate effort to safeguard specific caches from theft, but by a general desire to
cache more. This desire is brought on by stress, which is determined by the presence and dominance of onlookers, and by
unsuccessful recovery attempts. We study this theory in two experiments similar to those done with real birds with a kind of
‘virtual bird’, whose behavior depends on a set of basic assumptions about corvid cognition, and a well-established model
of human memory. Our results show that the ‘virtual bird’ acts as the real birds did; its re-caching reflects whether it has
been watched, how dominant its onlooker was, and how close to that onlooker it has cached. This happens even though it
cannot attribute mental states, and it has only a single behavioral rule assumed to be previously learned. Thus, our
simulations indicate that corvid re-caching can be explained without sophisticated social cognition. Given our specific
predictions, our theory can easily be tested empirically.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, the social cognition of corvids – the
extended family of crows – has been the subject of much scientific
attention. Experiments have shown, for instance, that Clark’s
nutcrackers can use human cues to find food [1], that pinyon jays
can reason about social hierarchies [2], and that rooks can
cooperate to obtain rewards [3]. Most impressive are the behaviors
that ravens [4,5,6,7] and scrub jays [8,9,10,11,12,13] display in
the context of caching. Like most corvids, these species hide food
under ground, saving it for later. However, items may be stolen by
conspecifics that saw the caching occur. This could create an
incentive for the birds to be sensitive to the visual perspectives of
others [14], and many results appear to confirm that they are.
When pilfering, if two ravens are present at a caching event, the
more subordinate one pilfers faster if the cache site was within the
dominant one’s field of vision, and thus likely to be stolen, than if
the cache site was not [5]. Similarly, when a raven is shown two
cache sites in front of a competitor, it first raids the cache that the
competitor also had a line of sight to, and only then the other [7].
When caching, corvids bury most of their items far away from
onlookers, and behind barriers [4,11,12]. Furthermore, scrub jays
often re-cache their worms later, when they are in private, if they
were forced to cache in the presence of others [8,9,10,11,12].
The two explanations that have been offered for these results
are the subject of intense debate [14,15,16,17]. First, the birds
could be reasoning about the mental states of their competitors
[14]. A scrub jay might infer that other birds intend to steal its
worms, and that if others see it caching they will know where its
worms are. Furthermore, a scrub jay could realize that caching far
away from onlookers makes it difficult for them to see its caches,
and that re-caching when alone will ensure that they no longer
know the locations of its items. According to this hypothesis, scrub
jays thus have some elements of a ‘theory of mind’. Alternatively,
the birds could be applying behavioral rules that they have learned
previously, from experience in daily life [16]. For instance,
through cache interruptions, ravens could learn the rule ‘cache far
away from onlookers’ [18]: The nearer conspecifics are, the
greater the likelihood that one of them will try to take the food the
cacher is trying to bury. In this way, the birds could learn that the
proximity of conspecifics implies cache loss, and should therefore
be avoided. However, they might also learn rules that are more
complex; for example, they might associate ‘a specific competitor’s
line of sight in the past’ with ‘a general feeling of unease’ regarding
a particular cache site.
A reason to favor this ‘prior learning hypothesis’ is that it seems
cognitively simpler than ‘theory of mind’; it does not require
corvids to be capable of mental state attribution, which is a
controversial claim for all species other than humans
[14,15,16,17]. However, as Tomasello and Call [19] have argued,
a weakness of current accounts that depend on prior learning is
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own ad-hoc behavioral rule, acquired in some hypothetical past
situation; see, for instance, Penn and Povinelli [16]. Furthermore,
for some of the more complex re-caching patterns exhibited by
scrub jays, it is difficult to imagine prior learning scenarios that are
plausible. For instance, in two studies [11,12], the birds not only
preferred to cache far away from conspecifics; hours later, when
they were alone, they also re-cached more of what they had
cached close to other birds. To learn this, the birds would have to
remember the distances between cache sites and onlookers, and
also relate these distances to pilfering rates. This seems cognitively
complex, especially for scrub jays in small aviaries [20], where the
effect of distance is likely to be small, and thus, difficult to detect.
Therefore, our aim is to develop a cognitively simple theory that
can explain the re-caching behavior of scrub jays without these
drawbacks. We do this by taking our existing computational model
of corvid cognition, as we have already shown that it generates
caching behavior that resembles that of real corvids [21]. In the
present paper, we extend this model with a single behavioral rule
assumed to be previously learned – a preference for caching far
away from conspecifics – and a new set of assumptions related to
stress. The model consists of a ‘virtual bird’. Its basic behavior is
driven by a memory system, based on broadly validated, similar
models built for humans [22,23]; for previous applications to other
species, see [24,25]. It stores one integrated memory of every act of
caching and recovery [26], and the more often, and the more
recently, it has cached or recovered at a particular site, the
stronger that memory will be [22]. The stronger its memory of
having cached somewhere, the lower its tendency to cache there
again, and the higher its tendency to recover there later. Similarly,
the stronger its memory of having recovered somewhere, the lower
its tendency to recover there again.
With regards to our model extensions related to stress,w e
assume that stress causes increased caching and, as a special case,
increased re-caching. This is inspired by work explicitly linking stress
to caching [27], based on the observation that birds cache more
when faced with poor habitat quality [28,29,30,31] and light body
weight [32,33,34]. Along the same lines, we interpret it as a sign of
stress that scrub jays often cache [8,10] and re-cache [11] more
when watched. Such enhanced caching in the presence of
conspecifics has also been reported for Eurasian jays [35],
although the opposite pattern has also been found, for both
Eurasian jays [36] and other species of corvid [37,38]. Here, we
focus on scrub jays, and thus, to mimic their behavior, we make
our ‘virtual bird’ re-cache more when it is watched. We also make
it re-cache more if the spectator is dominant than if it is
subordinate, as we assume that the former evokes more stress.
Furthermore, we posit that, in recovery sessions, finding caches
missing is a source of stress, and this, accordingly, makes our ‘virtual
bird’ re-cache more.
We investigate the consequences of these assumptions by
exposing our ‘virtual bird’ to simulated versions of two
experiments. The first compares caching in front of a conspecific
to caching alone, as done in an experiment by Emery and Clayton
[8]; the second concerns the effects of distance and the dominance
of onlookers, as tested by Dally, Emery and Clayton [12]. We
show that in both cases, our ‘virtual bird’ acts as the real birds did.
Results
The experiments that we simulated consisted of one caching
session and one recovery session, in which the scrub jays were tested
individually, in their home cages [8,12]. In a caching session, the
scrub jays were given a bowl of worms, and ice cube trays to cache
in. After caching, both were removed. The birds were left without
any food until the recovery session, several hours later. At that
point, they were mildly hungry, and their trays were returned to
them. For each experiment, we ran one hundred simulations at the
original sample size, and we created as many ‘virtual birds’ as
there were real birds. We averaged the results for each run, and
calculated the discrepancy with the empirical data. Further
analysis was done on the run closest to the average discrepancy.
The model has three adjustable parameters (Table S1): d,
governing how quickly memories decay, n, specifying the noise
in their likelihood of recall, and st, determining the stress threshold
at which recovering ‘virtual birds’ re-cache. They were kept
constant across experiments, and set so that the performance of
the ‘virtual birds’ matched that of the real birds. Our results were
robust, and depended only mildly on the model’s exact parameter
values; see Figure S1, Table S2, and Text S1.
Experiment 1: Watched by a Conspecific
Emery and Clayton [8] investigated whether scrub jays change
their re-caching behavior in response to being watched at caching.
This was tested in two different ways. First, the birds were given
three trials ‘with onlooker’ and three trials ‘in private’. On ‘with
onlooker’ trials, the cachers could see a bird in an adjacent cage;
on ‘in private’ trials, the cachers could not. At recovery, they were
always in private. The result was that the scrub jays re-cached a
significantly larger proportion of their worms on the ‘with
onlooker’ trials than the ‘in private’ ones (Figure 1A). In a second
setup, the same birds received two trials where they could cache in
two trays, one after the other. While caching in one of the trays,
there was a conspecific present; while caching in the other, there
was not. Several hours later, both trays were returned simulta-
neously, and the birds could recover in private. It was found that
they re-cached a significantly larger proportion of their worms
from the ‘with onlooker’ tray than the ‘in private’ tray (Figure 1B).
These results seem to suggest that the scrub jays remembered
whether they had been watched or not, and then re-cached in
order to protect themselves from future theft [8]. However, our
‘virtual birds’ behaved similarly, without recalling the social
context (Figure 1). The ‘virtual birds’ re-cached more on the trials
where they had been watched during caching than on the trials
where they had not been (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, n=7,
V=0,p=0.03), and they re-cached more from the tray in which
they had cached with an onlooker, than from the tray in which
Figure 1. Re-Caching in Experiment 1. Average proportion of
caches re-cached, real birds [8] and ‘virtual birds’, with standard errors.
Panel A: Alternating ‘watched’ and ‘in private’ trials. Panel B: At
recovery, ‘watched’ and ‘in private’ trays presented together.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032904.g001
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p=0.02). In the model, this is due to memory errors. In the
caching session, watched ‘virtual birds’ already re-cached, because
they were stressed by the presence of the spectator. Consequently,
in the recovery session, they remembered caching in many more
sites than actually contained worms. This confusion of their
memory caused them to experience more failed recovery attempts,
which in turn caused them to be more stressed – and thus, to re-
cache more.
Experiment 2: Onlooker Distance and Social Status
Dally, Emery and Clayton [12] investigated whether scrub jays
could take into account the proximity of another bird, as well as its
social status. To test this, the birds were allowed to cache in three
different conditions: Either in front of a dominant onlooker, in
front of a subordinate onlooker, or in private, with an opaque
partition separating them from a neighbor. In each case, they were
offered two ice cube trays to cache in, one near the adjacent bird,
and one farther away. It was found that the cachers preferred to
cache in the far tray when watched - either by a dominant or by a
subordinate - but that they showed no preference when alone.
Furthermore, during the recovery session, they re-cached a greater
proportion of their worms in the ‘dominant onlooker’ condition
than in either of the other two. When they had been watched, the
birds also seemed to re-cache specifically from the ‘near’ tray
(Figure 2A, 2B), although the sample size was too small for
statistical analysis.
These results seem to suggest that the re-caching behavior of the
birds depended on their memory of the social status of the
onlooker, but our ‘virtual birds’ remembered only the locations of
cache sites. Nevertheless, like in the empirical data, we found a
difference in re-caching rates between conditions (Friedman’s
analysis of variance, n=9, x2
2=11.67, p,0.01). This was because
the ‘virtual birds’ re-cached more when they had been watched by
a dominant than by a subordinate (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test,
n=9, V=28, p=0.02), or than when they had been alone
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, n=9,V=0,p,0.01).
This occurred because we made our ‘virtual bird’ more stressed
by dominant onlookers than by subordinate ones, and this caused
it to re-cache more during the caching session with the dominant
onlooker. This increased re-caching during the caching session
caused its memory to be more confused during the recovery session,
which in turn caused it to experience more recovery failures. In
our model, such recovery failures cause stress, and stress causes re-
caching, so this caused the ‘virtual bird’ to re-cache more during
the recovery session as well. Furthermore, like the real birds, the
‘virtual bird’ re-cached proportionally more from the ‘near’ tray
when it had been watched (Figure 2A, 2B), but not when it had
been in private (Figure 2C). This was due to the fact that it avoided
the proximity of others at caching, which we assume to have been
learned from daily life. As a consequence, the likelihood of
successfully recovering from the ‘near’ tray was statistically
smaller, because there were fewer worms in it. Therefore, the
‘virtual bird’ experienced more recovery failures in the ‘near’ tray,
which caused a higher level of stress to be associated with that tray,
and thus more re-caching.
Discussion
The re-caching behavior of our ‘virtual birds’ was similar to that
of the scrub jays. However, the ‘virtual birds’ lacked ‘theory of
mind’, and had only a single behavioral rule that was assumed to
be due to prior learning: A preference for caching far away from
conspecifics. In the recovery session, the ‘virtual birds’ did not
remember who had watched them, nor how close cache sites had
been to an onlooker, nor whether they had been watched at all.
Nevertheless, they displayed various behaviors typically interpret-
ed as indicators of ‘cache protection’: They re-cached more after
being watched than after being alone, they re-cached more after
caching with a dominant conspecific than after caching with a
subordinate one, and they re-cached a larger proportion of the
worms cached closer to an onlooker than of the worms cached
farther away. To summarize, these results can be explained as
follows: The more the ‘virtual bird’ was stressed at caching, the
more it re-cached during the caching session, and the more its
memory was confused later, during the recovery session. The more
its memory was confused at recovery, the more often it expected to
find worms in sites that were empty; the more it experienced such
recovery failures, the more stressed it was, and the more it re-
cached. Similarly, the less it had cached in a particular tray, the
lower its likelihood of successfully recovering there; the more it
failed, the more stressed it was, and the more it re-cached.
Empirical Predictions
One beneficial aspect of simulation models is that they can
generate empirical predictions that can be tested easily [39,40].
We list four. First, we predict that birds that re-cache more during
the recovery session must have also re-cached more during the
Figure 2. Re-Caching in Experiment 2. Average proportion of caches re-cached per tray, with standard errors, real birds [12,52] and ‘virtual birds’,
with standard errors, after caching in front of a dominant onlooker (Panel A), a subordinate onlooker (Panel B), or in private (Panel C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032904.g002
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session that causes the ‘virtual birds’ to experience memory
confusion at recovery, and it is the memory confusion that,
through stress, causes the re-caching; thus, without increased re-
caching during the caching session, our whole explanation breaks
down. For the vast majority of experiments, its presence or
absence is not reported [8,9,10,12]. Second, we predict that in a
recovery session, the birds start re-caching only after a number of
recovery failures. If that is not the case, then it cannot be stress
from recovery failures that causes re-caching. Third, we predict
that scrub jays must always re-cache proportionally more from
emptier trays. So, if scrub jays were forced to cache more worms in
one tray than in another, they should also re-cache more from the
emptier tray. Finally, we predict that any cause of stress should
produce enhanced re-caching, irrespective of the social context.
For instance, if some of a bird’s caches were removed by an
experimenter before its tray was returned, then we predict that it
should re-cache more. Although experiments that include cache
removal have frequently been done [26,41,42,43], whether this
causes the scrub jays to re-cache at recovery is not reported.
Other Experiments on the Social Cognition of Western
Scrub Jays
Other experiments on the social cognition of scrub jays can also
be interpreted within our framework. For instance, the fact that
scrub jays use shadows [9] and barriers [11] to protect their caches
can be captured by a slight rephrasing of the rule ‘prefer to cache
far away from onlookers’ to the more general version ‘prefer to
cache where onlookers are difficult to see’, and this can also be
assumed to have been previously learned. Then, like in our current
simulations, selective re-caching from ‘riskier’ trays would be due
to the stress caused by those trays containing fewer worms. Other
results require additional rules to be added to our model. For
instance, scrub jays seem to take into account which caches have
been seen by which onlookers [12]. Thus, it seems that they do
remember who was present during caching, unlike our ‘virtual
birds’. However, this does not imply that they have ‘theory of
mind’. Instead, it could be that the onlooker’s presence triggers the
subject’s memory of the stress it felt during caching, and that this
causes it to re-cache the associated caches, without any specific
intent to prevent those worms from being stolen by that onlooker.
With regards to scrub jays, one final result to consider is the fact
that only experienced pilferers appear to re-cache. This has been
described as a case of experience projection, ‘it takes a thief to
know a thief’ [8]. An alternative explanation is that scrub jays
usually do not feel threatened by onlookers in neighboring cages,
because such onlookers cannot actually reach their worms. In that
case, maybe only birds that have pilfered find it stressful to be
watched by an adjacent bird, because only they have experienced
that trays can be moved between cages. Thus, our hypothesis that
stress drives re-caching can also be extended to account for this
result.
Why Cache More While Being Watched?
Although our model is built upon the observation that Western
scrub jays often cache more when conspecifics are present
[8,10,11], it is still an open question why they do so, especially
given that other species of corvid usually show the opposite pattern
[36,37,44,45]. Clark’s nutcrackers, for instance, have been shown
to cache less when being watched than when not [44]. Clary and
Kelly [44] speculate that this species difference might be due to the
fact that scrub jays are more social than Clark’s nutcrackers, and
thus might consider the task to be cooperative. However, it seems
unlikely that this is the case; if scrub jays consider the task to be
cooperative, it is difficult to explain why they prefer to cache far
away from conspecifics [11]. Alternatively, one could argue that
for social birds it is not always feasible to inhibit caching until
alone; they might have to settle for ‘compensating’ future cache
theft, rather than avoiding it. Whether birds employ one strategy
or the other – ‘cache more while watched’ or ‘cache less while
watched’ – might also depend on individual experience, and the
specific situation. This would explain why both enhanced [35] and
reduced [36] caching have been found for Eurasian jays, and
corresponds well with the observation that ravens gradually
acquire some of their ‘cache protection techniques’ during
development [18].
The Larger Debate
In terms of the larger debate on the social cognition of corvids,
our results offer a way to explain the re-caching behavior of scrub
jays without ‘theory of mind’, and without ‘prior learning’ of many
different behavioral rules. Importantly, our account captures three
different re-caching patterns – based on onlooker presence,
dominance and distance – within a single explanatory framework.
Thus, our account of corvid re-caching avoids Tomasello and
Call’s [19] objection to ‘less cognitive’ theories of chimpanzee
social behavior – that there seem to be so many of them, with a
different ad-hoc rule explaining every single result. Of course, our
simulations do not imply that scrub jays are not reasoning about
the mental states of others; only that such reasoning is not
necessary to produce the results of these specific experiments. That
leaves many other aspects of corvid cognition to be explored by
our model, even if we confine ourselves to studies of caching.
Within the social realm, we could focus on the flexible pilfering
strategies of ravens [5,6,7], or the suppressed caching of Clark’s
nutcrackers in the presence of conspecifics [44]. Beyond that, there
are intriguing results on ‘mental time travel’ in Western scrub jays
[46,47,48], magpies [49] and Eurasian jays [50]; these three
species appear able to recall the ‘what-where-when’ of specific past
events [48,49], and to plan for specific future desires [46,47,50].
These are experiments we hope to address in future work.
Methods
To compare our simulations to the behavior of real birds, we
use the same statistical tests as in the empirical works [6,8]. Alpha
is set at 0.05, and all tests are two-tailed. Our simulations are
implemented in a Java program, CogCor, which is included in the
Supporting Information, Model Code S1. Conceptually, the
program consists of a setup model,asimulator model, and a cognitive
model. The setup model keeps track of the state of the ‘physical
world’ in the original experiments: What ice cube trays are
available, how many worms are cached where, and so on. The
simulator model runs the experiments: It ensures that the cognitive
model and the setup model are initialized, that the right number of
caching and recovery sessions are conducted, and that data is
collected for further analysis. The cognitive model is the ‘virtual
bird’; it consists of behavioral rules (Figure 3), which determine how
decisions are made, and memory chunks, on which decisions are
based.
Memory Chunks
All caching and recovery events are explicitly encoded in
memory, in chunks. A chunk’s type refers to whether it was a caching
or recovery event, and its location refers to the associated cache site.
In the case of a recovery event, a chunk also records success, which
refers to whether or not a cache was actually found. Thus, a chunk
is a memory of a particular kind of experience – caching in a site,
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Every time a ‘virtual bird’ experiences one of these events, it
creates the appropriate chunk, and encodes it in memory. If the
appropriate chunk already exists, it receives an update instead.
These updates help determine its activation, or ‘memory strength’.
A chunk h’s activation Ah depends on its recency and frequency of use
[22], as specified by Equation 1, where tj represents the elapsed
time t since use j of chunk h, and d is a decay parameter (Table 1).
This equation is adapted from ACT-R, a computational model
designed to study human cognition [23,51].
Ah~
X
j
tj
{d ð1Þ
For the purpose of computing the activations of chunks, time is
measured in steps. Every cache or recovery event counts as one
step, and time outside of the experimental sessions is not considered.
Although real animals definitely experience memory loss over
time, our approach still seems reasonable: The recovery accuracy
of Western scrub jays appears to decrease only after retention
intervals of several days [42], not the several hours used in these
experiments.
Behavioral Rules
The ‘virtual birds’ have two sets of behavioral rules: One for
caching sessions, one for recovery sessions. However, in each case, they
Figure 3. Model flowchart.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032904.g003
Table 1. Model variables.
Fixed Settings Parameters
oad oas crw crd crs dns t
21.25 20.5 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032904.t001
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is always the same. First, a ‘virtual bird’ evaluates all its possible
options – all the discrete ice cube tray sections that are on offer.
For each of these options, it estimates the ‘attractiveness’ of
caching or recovering there. In caching sessions, it estimates ‘cache
attractiveness’, in recovery sessions, it estimates ‘recovery attrac-
tiveness’; these will be explained further in coming sections.
However, both types of attractiveness always contain at least two
components, namely, inhibition of return, which helps the ‘virtual
bird’ avoid revisiting the same sites with the same purpose, and
noise.
Inhibition of Return. To calculate the inhibition of return Ik
associated with a site k, a ‘virtual bird’ checks whether any chunks l
exist of the current session’s type, that refer to the same site. If any
such chunks l exist, the effect of inhibition of return, Ik, associated
with site k is equal to Equation 2, where gAl is the sum of the
activations of all such chunks l. Thus, the stronger a ‘virtual bird’s’
memories of having cached in a particular location, the lower its
tendency to cache there again; similarly, the stronger its memories
of having recovered in a particular location, the lower its tendency
to recover there again.
Ik~
X
Al ð2Þ
Noise. Every site’s attractiveness always has a noise
component, representing sources of transient error. The noise
term is computed according to Equation 3, taken from the
cognitive architecture ACT-R [23,51], where n is a parameter that
we tune (Table 1), and r is a random value between 0 and 1.
noise~n :ln
1{r
r
ð3Þ
Caching Sessions. In a caching session, a ‘virtual bird’
makes as many caches as the real birds did in the corresponding
experiment. Every time it must decide where to cache, it chooses
the site with the highest ‘cache attractiveness’ Ck, as determined by
Equation 4. Here, Ok stands for the influence of onlooker aversion,
while Ik refers back to the inhibition of return of Equation 2, and
noise to the transient error of Equation 3.
Ck~{Ok{Ikznoise ð4Þ
The onlooker aversion component Ok causes the ‘virtual birds’ to
avoid caching in the ‘near’ tray in Experiment 2, where they are
watched by dominant and subordinate conspecifics [12]. As we
assume that increased distance is a preference that the scrub jays
have learned before the experiment, we incorporate it directly into
the model. Therefore, Ok is equal to oad for sites in the ‘near’ tray in
the ‘dominant onlooker’ condition, to oas for the same sites in the
subordinate onlooker condition, and to zero otherwise (Table 1).
The settings oad and oas are tuned so that approximately 25% of
the caches end up in the ‘near’ tray in each condition, as found in
the empirical data [12].
To capture our assumption that scrub jays are stressed by
having to cache in front of a conspecific, and that stress causes
them to re-cache [11], watched ‘virtual birds’ can immediately
recover a cache they have just created, with odds crw. Thus, every
time a ‘virtual bird’ caches in front of an onlooker, it has a small
chance of immediately recovering its worm. We set crw to 0.6,
which is tuned to our first experiment. There, it causes the ‘virtual
birds’ to re-cache worms an average of 1.29 times when they are
watched; this is very close to the empirical average of 1.2 [11].
Furthermore, for Experiment 2, we assume that dominant
onlookers evoke more stress than subordinate onlookers, and that
this translates into more stress; therefore we set the respective re-
caching odds crd and crs to 0.8 and 0.4 (Table 1).
Recovery Sessions. In a recovery session, a ‘virtual bird’
continues to recover until it has recovered all its caches. In reality,
this is usually not the case; recovery percentages between 39% and
73% have been reported [8,10], and another study mentions that ‘a
few items were often cached and not recovered’ [12]. Furthermore,
in some cases, the birds recovered relatively more of their ‘watched’
caches than their ‘in private’ ones [8,10]. However, without a
specific theory of scrub jay motivation – why they cache as much as
they do, why they eat as much as they do – having the ‘virtual birds’
always recover everything seemed simplest.
Every time a ‘virtual bird’ must decide where to recover, it
chooses the site with the highest ‘recovery attractiveness’ Rk,a s
determined by Equation 5. Here, Fk is a cache relocation effect,
which helps the ‘virtual bird’ recover at sites where it has
previously cached, while the inhibition of return Ik and noise are the
same as described previously, in Equations 2 and 3 respectively.
Rk~Fk{Ikznoise ð5Þ
The cache relocation effect Fk associated with a site k depends on
the existence of a cache chunk o referring to the same site. Then,
the cache relocation effect associated with site k is equal to that
chunk’s current activation Ao (Equation 1). Thus, the stronger a
‘virtual bird’s’ memory of having cached somewhere, the more
attractive it finds it to recover there.
If a ‘virtual bird’ recovers a worm, it needs to decide whether to
re-cache it. To do so, it first calculates the safety risk Sk associated
with the site k where it just found its worm. This safety risk
depends on its previous recovery experiences with site k’s tray, but
only on those recovery experiences directed at its actual cache sites
or their neighbors. This is in line with our previous work [21],
where we show that scrub jays probably do not learn from all their
recovery attempts, but only from those that are directed at sites
where they have cached.
To calculate the safety risk Sk associated with site k, a ‘virtual
bird’ compares the ratio of ‘unsuccessful recovery attempts’ to
‘total recovery attempts’ within site k’s tray, according to Equation
6, where Au is the total activation of chunks encoding unsuccessful
recovery attempts, and As the total activation of chunks encoding
successful recovery attempts. This ratio is then compared to the
stress threshold st, which is a parameter that we tune (Table 1). If
Sk is greater than st, the ‘virtual bird’ re-caches the worm. Once a
worm is re-cached in a recovery session, it is not recovered again.
This assumption is made to keep the model as simple as possible,
but it is also consistent with the empirical data. Unwatched,
recovering scrub jays re-cache mainly in ‘out of tray’ locations,
elsewhere in their home cages, and re-cache most worms only
once [12].
Sk~
Au
AuzAs
ð6Þ
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